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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
an expression of a congressional desire for a state to enter the field." More-
over, in a recent case the Court seemingly granted to a state the right to
act under its police power even when Congress had entered the field, when
such action was merely complementary or supplementary to the congres-
sional regulation and did not conflict with the federal legislation.' 2
Although Congress has the power to regulate the transmission of tele-
phone and telegraph messages over state lines as interstate commerce,'
the Court has upheld state regulations that impose penalties on communi-
cation companies for the failure to meet certain prescribed duties already
owed to the public.' 4 A telephone or telegraph company is duty bound to
refuse to render services,' 5 or to discontinue them' 6 when such services con-
tribute to, or facilitate, gambling operations. Therefore, merely conducting
these activities under the guise of interstate commerce does not hinder the
power of a state in its efforts to protect the morals and welfare of the
public.' 7 In reality, a statute such as this affects commerce only to the
extent that it deprives those employed in its violation of the fruits obtained
from paving the way for unlawful enterprises.' 8
The mere creation of a federal agency and granting to it the right 'to
control commerce does not in itself interfere with state regulation condu-
cive to the public well-being.' 9 The state's power to control the use of
private wires should be circumscribed only when Congress acts to make
this a matter of national concern or future events prove this to be a field
demanding uniform federal regulation.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Defendant was convicted by a New York Magistrate's Court for
conducting a religious meeting on the public streets without a permit.'
He had previously been issued a permit, which later was revoked after
a hearing before the police commissioner wherein complaints were pre-
sented and proven that defendant had aroused animosity by violently
11. The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1912).
12. California v. Zook, 336.U.S.725 (1949), 4 MIAMI L.Q. 106.
13. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Speight, 254 U.S. 17 (1920).
14. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Crove, 220 U.S. 364 (1911); Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U.S. 406 (1910)i Western Union Tel. Co. v.
James, 162 U.S. 650 (1890).
15. Andrews v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 83 F. Supp. 966 (D. D.C. 1949).
16. Hamilton v. Western Union Tel. Co., 34 F. Supp. 928 (N.D. Ohio 1940).
17. State v. Stripling, 113 Ala. 120, 21 So. 409 (1897).
18. State v. Harbourne, 70 Conn. 484, 40 Atl. 409 (1897).
19. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Harris, 234 U.S. 412 (1914).
1. "... Any clergyman or minister of any denomination . . . may conduct religious
services . . . in any public place or places specified in a permit therefor which may be
granted and issued by the police commissioner . ,' ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF THE CITy
OF NEW YORK, § 435-7.0.
CASES NOTED
castigating two religions. Defendant appealed the conviction, claiming
that the statute requiring a permit was unconstitutional in that it allowed
the police commissioner to determine as a censor who could address the
public on the streets. Held, that the statute is constitutional, being only
a necessary and reasonable regulation of the use of public streets. People
v. Kunz, 90 N.E.2d 455 (N.Y. 1949).
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution declares that
Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or assembly.2
Judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment 3 has rendered the
legislatures of the states as incapable as Congress to enact such laws.4
However, the freedom of speech guaranteed by these provisions is not an
absolute right 5 but is subject to certain restraints. Therefore, when free-
dom of speech is involved, the problem is to determine the nature and
extent of restraints permissible in the interest of society.
The imposition of a prior restraint,6 or censorship, upon free speech
has been condemned since the time of Blackstone7 Though the court has
invalidated injunctions,' license taxes,9 registration requirements,' 0 and
permit requirements'' on the basis that a prior restraint upon civil liber-
ties was thereby imposed, the fact that a statute may or may not impose
a prior restraint is not a sufficient guide in determining the constitutionality
of the statute. This is true since a penal statute may be as effective as a
prior restraint in curtailing free expression and dissemination of ideas.' 2
However, prior restraints, imposed either by prohibitive or penal provis-
ions, have been upheld when the public interest has so demanded. 3
Conversely, even though no prior restraint was actually exercised,"4 statutes
have been held unconstitutional where the exercise of wide discretion-
ary power by an official was possible. It appears that two factors are to
2. U.S. CONST. AMEND. I.
3. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § I (Due process clause).
4. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1923) ; Stroniberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931) (freedom of speech protected by Fourteenth Amendment).
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1875) (freedom of assembly protected by
Fourteenth Amendment).
5. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
6. See the discussion of prior restraints in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714(1931.)
7. 4- BzL. COMM. 151, 152.
8. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
9. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)i Follett v. Town of McCormick,
321 U.S. 573 (1944).
10. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
11. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940) 5 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
12. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98 (1939).
13. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
supra.
14. United States v. C.I.O., 335 U.S. 106 (194.8); Thornhill v. Alabama, supra.
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be considered in adjudicating restraints upon free speech: first, whether
discretionary power is vested in any administrative or judicial official
and, second, the point at which freedom of speech interferes excessively
with the rights and privileges of others.
In reference to the power of officials, the vice which the Supreme Court
abhors is a vagueness in the restraining statute which allows possible dis-
cretionary action on the part of the official. 1 Thus, if a statute is narrow-
ly drawn to prohibit a specific substantial evil, the fact that a local official
is invested with a restraining or punishing power is not repugnant to the
letter or spirit of the Constitution.' 6 However, a finding that the statute
does not vest an official with wide discretionary power is not determinative
of the problems since free speech may not be restrained beyond certain
limits regardless of the narrowness of the statute. Though the Court has
held that no constitutional problem is raised by the prevention or punish-
ment of the "lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, the insulting or
'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace,"' 1 such a standard is too narrow to be
applicable in all situations where the exercise of free speech comes in
conflict with public comfort, convenience or safety. Rather, the Court
has decided that the limit beyond which freedom of speech does not ex-
tend is where such speech creates a clear and present danger of a substan-
tial evil." Such a line of demarcation is flexible and has fluctuated ac-
cording to the state of national affairs, t9 but nevertheless has proven to
be the most satisfactory standard yet proposed.
In cases directly involving the use of public streets and other public
places for the dissemination of ideas, the courts have considered both
the limits of free speech and the possibility of discretionary action on
the part of a local official. As a limitation upon free speech, interference
with traffic has been deemed to be a substantial evil justifying the in-
voking of the clear and present danger rule.2 0 Therefore, certain discre-
tionary powers may be granted to an official in the issuance of permits
as a condition to the use of the public place.21 However, this discretion
15. See Saia v. New York, supra at 560, Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra at 311
Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 112 (1940).
16. See People v. Hlass, 299 N.Y. 190, 192, 86 N.E.2d 169, 171 (1949); People v.
Nahman, 298 N.Y. 95, 102, 81 N.E.2d 36, 38 (1948); Cox v. New Hampshire, supra
at 574.
17. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra at 572.
18. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). For a discussion of the develop-
ment and application of the clear and present danger doctrine, see, Comment, 4 MIAMI
L.Q. 67 (1949).
19. See O'Brien, Restraints Upon Individual Freedom in Times of National Emerg-
ency, 26 CORNL L.Q. 523.
20. Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra at 308.
21. Cox v. New Hampshire, supra; Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra.
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must be specifically confined to a consideration of time and place of the
speech. When the discretion extends to a determination of the permissible
contents of a speech, the statute is unconstitutional. 2
In the present case, the statute in question makes no provision for
any discretionary action. However, the court decided that a discretionary
power of revocation was implied. But the necessary standards of limi-
tation upon the discretion of the commissioner are not present in the
statute. Nor did the court, through its decision, provide a basis upon
which permits may be refused. Rather, it only finds a power to prevent
possible religious riots analogous to the power to ban all raucously noisy
advertising devices.2 3 The court decided that defendant had no constitu-
tional right to wantonly wound the feelings of others and thus create a
possibility of riot necessitating the presence of police. But, the fact that
a speech arouses animosity is not a sufficient clear and present danger of
a substantial evil to justify restraint.2 4 Nor can free speech he suppressed
under the guise of maintaining desirable conditions." It may be that the
speech came within the fighting words doctrine of the Chaplinsky case 6
and that defendant could have been punished for a breach of the peace.
However, an absolute restraint upon the right to speak in the future be-
cause of past misconduct is not in keeping with the Supreme Court's views.2 7
Though the statute requiring a permit for street preaching appears to
be constitutional on its face as being only a necessary and reasonable regu-
lation of the use of public streets, the court's decision has placed an un-
constitutional power of discretion and censorship in the police commis-
sioner, such decision being as effective as if the statute had been so amend-
ed.2 8 Because of the unlimited power of discretion by the commissioner,
the statute should be held unconstitutional without the necessity of de-
ciding if the defendant's action came either within the C/.'plinsky rule
or created a clear and present danger of a substantial evil.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
SEARCH OF PREMISES WITHOUT WARRANT REASONABLE
AS INCIDENT TO LEGAL ARREST
Federal officers, knowing well in advance that defendant had committed
the crime of selling forged and altered postal stamps with intent to defraud'
22. Hague v. C.I.O., supra; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) Lovell v. City
of Griffin, supra.
23. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). See also 3 MIAMI L.Q. 452 (1949).
24. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
25. See Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 514- (1939).
26. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, mlupra at 572.
27. Near v. Minnesota, supra; but cf. Milk Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Co., 312
U.S. 287 (1941) (Picketing enjoined because of past violence).
28. See Winters v. New York, 33 U.S. 507, 514 (1947).
1. IS U.S.C. § 268 (1946).
